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4 edition of Necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium found in the catalog.

Necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium

by Charles D. Kolstad

  • 232 Want to read
  • 28 Currently reading

Published by Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass .
Written in English


Edition Notes

Other titlesCournot equilibrium, Necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a.
StatementCharles D. Kolstad, Lars Mathiesen.
SeriesWorking paper / Alfred P. Sloan School of Management -- WP#1842-86, Working paper (Sloan School of Management) -- 1842-86.
ContributionsMathiesen, Lars., Sloan School of Management.
The Physical Object
Pagination19 p. :
Number of Pages19
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL17942834M
OCLC/WorldCa16319561

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium. Previous uniqueness results have depended on an assumption of non-degeneracy of equilibrium. As we illustrate, this assumption often fails in multi-stage games with proper Cournot subgames. The paper provides new conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and symmetry of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the classical Cournot duopoly. Keywords: Cournot duopoly, potential games, pure-strategy Nash equilibria, existence, uniqueness, symmetry.

  We derive sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot equilibria for a supply chain problem with a single manufacturer and multiple asymmetric retailers and characterize the first and second order derivatives of the total equilibrium .   We consider a class of homogeneous Cournot oligopolies with concave integrated price flexibility and convex cost functions. We provide new results about the semi-uniqueness and uniqueness of (Cournot) equilibria for the oligopolies that satisfy these conditions. The condition of concave integrated price flexibility is implied by (but does not imply) the log-concavity of a continuous .

Downloadable (with restrictions)! The properties of Cournot mixed oligopoly consisting of one public firm and one or more than one private firms have mostly been analyzed for simple cases on the basis of numerical calculations of the equilibrium values for a linear market demand function and linear or quadratic cost functions. In this paper, after proving the existence of a unique equilibrium. Charles D. Kolstad & Lars Mathiesen, "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages F. H. Hahn, "The Stability of the Cournot Oligopoly Solution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages


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Necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium by Charles D. Kolstad Download PDF EPUB FB2

Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium CHARLES D. KOLSTAD University of Illinois and M.I. and LARS MATHIESEN Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration First version received January ; final version accepted February (Eds.) In this paper a theorem is developed giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the.

In this paper a theorem is developed giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of homogeneous product Cournot equilibria. The result appears to be the strongest to date and the. In this paper a theorem is developed giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of homogeneous product Cournot equilibria.

The result appears to be the strongest to date and the first to involve both necessity and by:   Abstract. Necessary conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria introduced by Joó (A note on minimax theorems, Annales Univ.

Sci. Budapest, 39(), –) for concave non-cooperative games are generalized and then applied to Cournot oligopoly for a specified class of games there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, then cost functions of the firms must be : Ferenc Forgó, Zoltán Kánnai. Sufficient and necessary conditions for an aggregative game to have a unique Nash equilibrium are identified.

In particular, an improvement of a result of Gaudet and Salant () for Cournot. NecessaryandSufficientConditionsforUniqueness ofaCournotEquilibrium d SloanSchoolofManagement MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology LarsMathiesen.

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium. Previous uniqueness results have depended on an assumption of non-degeneracy of equilibrium. The problem of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existe nce of a unique Cournot equilibrium has been rarely dealt with in the literature.

This banner text can have markup. web; books; video; audio; software; images; Toggle navigation. In [7], J. Rosen gave sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium points of concave games but his result does not imply the statements of the theo- rems of the present paper.

EQUILIBRIUM POINT ANALYSIS FOR A PURELY OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET Let the functions f and ki, 1. C.D. Kolstad, L. MathiesonNecessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium Review of Economic Studies, 54 (), pp. Google Scholar. Downloadable.

We provide sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium. The contraction mapping approach is used. Equilibrium is characterized in terms of marginal costs. The result is useful for applications to two-stage games, where, in the first stage, firms incur costs to manipulate their marginal costs of production.

In this paper, after proving the existence of a unique equilibrium in Cournot mixed oligopoly under general conditions on the market demand and each firm’s cost function, we derive conditions ensuring the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for the mixed oligopoly where one public firm and at least one of the private firms are active in a.

Quartieri, F. [] Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of a Unique Cournot Equilibrium, Ph.D. thesis, Siena-Università di Siena, Italy. Google Scholar; Szidarovszky, F.

and Okuguchi, K. [] On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games, Games Econ. Behav. 18 –   In this paper we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Cournot equilibrium when demand is rho-linear and firms are identical and produce under constant returns to scale.

We focus on inelastic and convex demand which yields non concave profit functions. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium. By Charles D Kolstad and Lars Mathiesen. Abstract. In this paper, a theorem is developed giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of homogeneous product Cournot equilibria.

The result appears to be the strongest to date and the first to involve. The sufficient conditions for local stability of a unique Cournot equilibrium are much less restrictive than what the existing literature suggests.

For a symmetric cost oligopoly the unique Cournot equilibrium is almost always locally stable, except for a perverse case. We revisit the linear Cournot model with uncertain demand that is studied in Lagerlöf ( “Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty.” The B.E.

Journal of Theoretical Economics 6, no. (Topics), Article 1–6.) and provide sufficient conditions for equilibrium uniqueness that complement the existing results.

The paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the standard Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product.

The main condition is elementary, easy to interpret, and nests all known sufficient conditions in the literature. Necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium By Charles D. Kolstad and Lars Mathiesen Publisher: Cambridge, Mass.: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

cournot equilibrium: Abstract: We identify sufficient and necessary conditions for an aggregative game to have a unique Nash equilibrium.

In particular, an improvement of a result of Gaudet and Salant () for Cournot oligopolies is obtained. Necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium.

Review of Economic Stud Liu, L., Correlated equilibrium of Cournot oligopoly competition. Journal of Economic The Miigrom, P., Roberts, J., Rationalizability, learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities.Kolstad, C.D. and L. Matlhesen () "Necessary and suihcient conditions for uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium" Review of Economic Studies Global stability of Cournot .